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Abstract
This paper analyses optimal income taxes over the business cycle
under a balanced-budget restriction, for low, middle and high income
households. A model incorporating capital-skill complementarity in
production and di¤erential access to capital and labour markets is de-
veloped to capture the cyclical characteristics of the US economy, as
well as the empirical observations on wage (skill premium) and wealth
inequality. We nd that the tax rate for high income agents is opti-
mally the least volatile and the tax rate for low income agents the least
countercyclical. In contrast, the path of optimal taxes for the middle
income group is found to be very volatile and counter-cyclical. We
further nd that the optimal response to output-enhancing capital
equipment technology and spending cuts is to increase the progres-
sivity of income taxes. Finally, in response to positive TFP shocks,
taxation becomes more progressive after about two years.
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1 Introduction
There is a considerable literature that aims to characterize the properties
of optimal tax policy over the business cycle (see e.g. Chari et al. (1994),
Stockman (2001) and Arseneau and Chugh (2012)). This research has ac-
knowledged the importance of market imperfections and of restrictions to
the policy menu for optimal taxation. For instance, while in a frictionless
labour market the labour income tax should optimally not vary much over
the business cycle and remain a-cyclical, Arseneau and Chugh (2012) show
that under search frictions in the labour market, the optimal labour income
tax becomes very volatile and counter-cyclical. Moreover, Stockman (2001)
shows that a balanced-budget restriction leads to an increase of the optimal
volatility of the labour relative to capital taxes.
The literature, however, has not yet examined optimal income taxes over
the business cycle under imperfections that limit the participation of house-
holds in markets for skilled labour and capital. This is despite the em-
pirical evidence on increased wage inequality associated with capital-skill
complementarities in production1 and the importance of "hand-to-mouth"
consumers for economic policy in response to economic uctuations.2
Income taxation has naturally been a focal point for the research on
economic policy under income inequality (see e.g. the work reviewed and
analysed in Kocherlakota (2010)). This is because, on one hand, progres-
sive income taxation can be used to reduce income inequality and promote a
fairer distribution of income. On the other hand, the disincentives associated
with taxation and, in particular, with progressive taxation, need to be taken
into account. In light of this, the normative properties relating to the pro-
gressivity of the tax system have been extensively analysed (see e.g. Mankiw
et al. (2009) for an assessment of this literature). However, the response of
optimal income taxes in business cycle frequencies to exogenous productivity
and government spending shocks, under a balanced budget and both wage
and asset inequalities, has not been examined. This is particularly relevant
given the presence of these inequalities and the current economic reality that
severely limits the use of debt to respond to economic uctuations in most
advanced economies. In such an environment, the revenue requirements for
governments that are faced with exogenous aggregate shocks need to nanced
by unpleasant taxes, so that a pertinent question for policymaking becomes
how to distribute the tax burden over the business cycle to minimise the
1See, e.g. Hornstein et al. (2005) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for a review of the
literature on wage inequality and the skill premium.
2See, for example, the papers by Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Mankiw (2000) and
Galí et al. (2007).
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negative e¤ect of distorting taxes.
In light of the above, we aim to analyse optimal income taxes under a
balanced budget over the business cycle in a model that captures the cyclical
characteristics of the economy and the empirical observations on wage (skill
premium) and wealth inequality. To this end, we develop a model economy
characterised by capital-skill complementarity in the production process, a
labour market that is fragmented with respect to skill and capital market
imperfections that lead to the exclusion of a subset of the population from
holding assets.
Our model thus consists of three types of households, representing high,
middle and low income groups, as well as two labour markets, for skilled and
unskilled labour. We assume imperfections which preclude. These prevent
all households from participating in both markets. In particular, we assume
that the rst type of household provides skilled labour services, capturing
the supply of college-educated workers in the labour market. The other two
types of households, in contrast, provide unskilled labour, and they repre-
sent the part of the labour force that does not have a college qualication.
The production structure implies that there are two wage rates in the model,
leading to a skill premium. Following the contributions of Katz and Mur-
phy (1992) and Krusell et al. (2000), we assume that the skill premium is
driven by skill-biased technical change and capital-skill complementarities.
In particular, we assume that the production process follows the technology
specied in Krusell et al. (2000) which has received empirical support and
has been shown to match the behavior of the skill premium in the data.
Capital market imperfections imply that households in our model di¤er
with respect to their participation in the asset markets. In particular, fol-
lowing the contributions of Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Mankiw (2000)
and Galí et al. (2007), we assume that a subset of the households does not
have any savings and is thus earning only labour income, which it totally
consumes. We further assume that these households o¤er unskilled labour
services, so that the three types of households in the economy are dened as,
high income skilled agents who own assets, middle income unskilled agents
who also own assets and low income unskilled agents who do not have access
to the capital market.
Compared to the representative agent optimal taxation literature of e.g.
Chari et al. (1994), Stockman (2001) and Arseneau and Chugh (2012), our
modeling instead emphasises the importance of imperfections that lead to
wage and wealth inequality as well as the balanced-budget constraint im-
posed on optimal income taxation. In contrast to the heterogeneous agents
literature of optimal taxation (see e.g. the work reviewed and analysed in
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Kocherlakota (2010))3, our modeling emphasises wage inequalities that are
driven by capital-skill complementarities, in conjunction with asset market
participation inequalities and focuses on the business cycle properties of in-
come taxes.
We calibrate a version of the model with exogenous tax policy to the U.S.
quarterly data and nd that the model ts the data very well with respect
to key long-run stylized facts as well as the cyclical properties of the data,
including the empirical ndings that the skill premium is e¤ectively a-cyclical
and not volatile.4 Having established the empirical relevance of the model,
we then characterize optimal policy, by letting the government choose the
income tax rates optimally over the business cycle to maximise aggregate
welfare given its revenue requirements.
We nd that the cyclical properties of the income tax rates di¤er signif-
icantly with each other and with those observed in the data. As expected,
given the balanced budget restriction and the instruments available to the
government, the tax rates are generally more volatile and more counter-
cyclical than in the data. However, there are also important di¤erences
between the tax rates. These result from the trade-o¤ that the government
faces when deciding how to distribute the distortions reected by the higher
volatility and countercyclicality of the three tax rates over the business cycle.
On one hand, such distortions have a large impact on hand-to-mouth house-
holds, since they are less able to smooth shocks. There is thus an incentive
to minimise the impact of policy for this type of household. On the other
hand, tax-induced distortions to skilled households have the strongest prop-
agation e¤ects in the economy, given the complementarity of skilled hours
with equipment capital. Therefore, there is also an incentive to minimise
distortions to the choices of skilled households, since this acts to amplify
external shocks. Optimal policy resolves this trade-o¤ by keeping the lowest
volatility for the tax rate for skilled and the lowest countercyclicality for the
hand-to-mouth. In contrast, the middle income group, made up by unskilled
households with savings, receives very volatile, very counter-cyclical taxes.
We further analyse the optimal distribution of the tax burden in the
short- and medium-run in response to temporary output-enhancing exoge-
nous shocks. The government nds it optimal to respond to an increase in
the productivity of capital equipment and to public spending cuts by in-
3This literature pays particular attention to the unobservability of idiosyncratic labour
productivity, which drives wage inequality. However, here we emphasise observable Uni-
versity education and employment in skilled jobs which drive the college-premium wage
inequality.
4See e.g. Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011) for similar exercises in model
evaluation with wage inequality and the skill premium.
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creasing the progressivity of income taxes. In the case of capital equipment
technology shocks, in particular, the government nds it optimal to redis-
tribute some of the gains to skilled workers, who are the main beneciaries
of such changes, to the more constrained households in the labour market.
This is achieved by increasing the high-income tax and reducing the other
two taxes. Public spending cuts allow the government to reduce all income
taxes, but the reduction is higher the lower the income level of the household.
Finally, the response to positive total factor productivity (TFP) shocks im-
plies that the progressivity of the tax system increases after about two years.
The sensitivity of the income of hand-to-mouth households with respect to
TFP shocks implies that the government needs to use a pro-cyclical tax on
impact in this case to help smooth consumption. As a result, income taxes
to low income agents increase immediately after positive TFP shocks.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the model
structure. Sections 3 and 4 describe the cyclical properties of the model under
exogenous and optimal scal policy respectively. Finally, the conclusions are
presented in Section 5.
2 Model
Our model is developed to capture the key business cycle features of an
economy characterised by imperfections that limit participation in labour
and capital markets. We rst consider a fragmented labour market, so that
there exist separate markets for "skilled" and "unskilled" labour, dened
as workers with and without college education, and assume that there exist
socio-economic barriers that do not allow mobility between the two types
of labour.5 This is motivated by empirical evidence which suggests that in
business cycle frequencies the share of college educated population in the data
has low volatility and is e¤ectively uncorrelated with output. In particular,
using the data in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we nd that the standard
deviation of the cyclical component of the skilled population share, relative
5When looking at longer horizons, it is natural to allow for mobility from unskilled
to skilled labour, associated with human capital investment and university education (see
e.g. He (2012) and Angelopoulos et al. (2013b) for models incorporating the joint de-
termination of the relative skill supply and the skill premium). In such contexts, the
microfoundations that lead to socio-economic exclusion and/or social mobility are impor-
tant for long-run outcomes and transitional dynamics (see e.g. Matsuyama (2006) and
Aghion and Howitt (2009, ch. 6)). Here, focusing on business cycle frequencies, we take
the barriers that lead to the split in the labour force to skilled and unskilled workers as
given.
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to that of output, is 0.27, while its correlation with output is -0.18.6 These
ndings suggest that the imperfections (in the form of, e.g. socio-economic
barriers relating to access to education) which determine participation in
labour markets are indeed more restrictive in shorter, business cycle horizons.
This environment leads to wage inequality. Following the literature on
the skill premium driven wage inequality (see e.g. Hornstein et al. (2005)
and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for reviews), we assume that the produc-
tion process involves two types of labour inputs, i.e. skilled and unskilled
which have di¤erent degrees of complementarity with capital. In particular,
the production technology involves two types of capital and it is assumed
that skilled labour services complement equipment capital in production rel-
atively more than unskilled labour services, such that there is an increase in
the skill premium in the labour market when technological innovations are
augmenting equipment capital.
We also allow for transaction costs for participating in capital markets
(see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and Benigno (2009)). Given in-
equalities in asset ownership, and in particular, evidence that suggests higher
wealth for skilled relative to unskilled workers7, we distinguish these costs be-
tween skilled and unskilled households. This leads to di¤erent asset holdings
across workers, and in particular, implies that a subset of the population is
excluded from the asset markets (see e.g. Aghion and Howitt (2009, ch. 6)
for capital market imperfections and agent heterogeneity). Excluded agents
are thus not permitted to accumulate capital stock to smooth consumption,
as they consume all their (labour) income (see e.g. Campbell and Mankiw
(1989), Mankiw (2000) and Galí et al. (2007) for hand-to-mouth consumers).
We assume that hand-to-mouth households o¤er unskilled labour services.
The above assumptions lead to an economy where households di¤er in
their participation in both the labour and the asset markets.8 More speci-
cally, there are three types of households: (i) skilled, s, who save and provide
skilled labour; (ii) unskilled, u, who save and provide unskilled labour; and
(iii) hand-to-mouth, h, who do not save and provide unskilled labour. Given
the previous discussion, the composition of the population is assumed to be
6This is obtained using annual data for the share of college educated population mea-
sured in e¢ ciency units, 1963-2008, from Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and GDP data from
the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). The cyclical component of the
series is obtained using the HP-lter with a smoothing parameter of 100.
7Data from the 2010 U.S. Census, which will be discussed below in more detail, indicate
that the wealth of the population with at least a bachelor degree is two and half times
more than those without a bachelor degree.
8A similar population decomposition is considered in the analysis of U.K. policy reforms
in Angelopoulos et al. (2013a).
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constant and exogenous. For simplicity, we also assume that the total size of
the population, N , is constant. The above implies that N = Ns +Nu +Nh,
where we dene ns = Ns=N , nu = Nu=N , and nh = 1   ns   nu. There are
also N identical rms and a government.
In each period, households act as price takers and make decisions re-
garding how much to consume, work and save. Firms act competitively and
employ two types of capital stock together with the two types of labour to
produce a homogeneous product. The government runs a balanced budget
and imposes di¤erent tax rates on each income level. It uses the revenue
from these taxes to nance public spending.
2.1 Households
Households, denoted with the subscript j = s; u; h, maximize expected life-
time utility:
Uj = Et
1X
t=0
tu(Cj;t; Cj;t 1; lj;t) (1)
where Et is the conditional expectations operator at period t; 0 <  < 1 is a
constant discount factor; Cj;t and lj;t are private consumption and leisure re-
spectively at period t; Cj;t 1 is the average consumption of the j-type house-
holds in period t   1, which is taken as given at the household level, and
captures external habits in consumption (see e.g. Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) and Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000));9 and u() is the utility function
which satises the Inada conditions. As discussed below, the presence of
habits allows the model to match the empirical cyclical properties of con-
sumption in the data.
The specic form for utility is given by:
u(Cj;t; Cj;t 1; lj;t) =
 
Cj;t   !Cj;t 1

l1 j;t
(1 )
1   (2)
where ! measures the weight attached to external consumption habits within
each type of household;  > 1 is coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion; and
0 <  < 1 is the weight of e¤ective consumption in utility.
A household of type j faces the following time constraint:
1 = lj;t + hj;t (3)
9Hence, we assume that there is "catching-up with the Joneses in the neighborhood",
since each household compares its consumption level to that of its socio-economic class.
See Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) for a discussion on various forms of catching-up and
keeping-up with the Joneses and internal versus external habits.
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where hj;t is hours worked in period t. Additionally, skilled and unskilled
households face the following budget constraint:
Cj;t + I
i
j;t = (1  j;t)wj;thj;t + (1  j;t)
 
rqtK
q
j;t + r
e
tK
e
j;t
  Tt  (4)
   j
 
Kqj;t
2
+
 
Kej;t
2
while hand-to-mouth households face the constraint:
Ch;t = (1  h;t)wu;thh;t   Tt (5)
where the superscript i = q; e refers to structures, q, and equipment, e; I ij;t
is investment; Kij;t is the capital stock; wj;t is the wage rate;  j is the capital
transaction cost for j = s; u; and Tt is a lump-sum tax. The above budget
constraints capture several key features of the model. First, the households
di¤er in their labour income, as there are di¤erent wage rates for skilled
and unskilled households. Second, the households also di¤er in their capital
income, since they face di¤erent transaction costs. In particular, the hand-
to-mouth households implicitly face transaction costs that are innite, so
that they are excluded from the capital markets. The remaining households
face nite transaction costs, modelled here as quadratic functions of the
capital stock, following e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Benigno (2009).
These may di¤er so that the households can be di¤erentiated with respect to
their steady-state holdings of wealth. Third, there are two types of capital
holdings, in structures and equipment, which pay di¤erent rates of return.
The importance of allowing for the two types of capital is explained below in
the discussion of skill-biased technology in production. Fourth, for each level
of income, as reected by the household type, there is a di¤erent income tax
rate.
Finally the motion of the capital stock for j = s; u is:
Kij;t+1 = (1  i)Kij;t + I ij;t (6)
where, 0  i  1 is the depreciation rate.
Each household j = s; u chooses fCj;t; hj;t; Kqj;t+1; Kej;t+1; Iqj;t; Iej;tg1t=0, to
maximise (1) subject to (2), (3), (4) and (6), by taking policy variables,
prices, and aggregate quantities (i.e. Cj;t 1) as given. Similarly, hand-to-
mouth households, j = h, choose fCh;t; hh;tg1t=0, to maximise (1) subject to
(2), (3) and (5), by taking policy variables, prices, and aggregate quantities
(i.e. Ch;t 1) as given. The optimality conditions for the households are given
in Appendix A.
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2.2 Production and rms
Each rm maximises its prots in perfectly competitive markets, by using
labour and capital inputs to produce output, Yt. The production function
follows the specication in Krusell et al. (2000) which has been shown to
match the behavior of the skill premium in the data.10 In particular, there are
two types of capital used in production, capital in structures and equipment,
denoted respectively as Kf;qt and K
f;e
t and two types of labour, skilled and
unskilled, denoted respectively as hfs;t and h
f
u;t. The production function is
given by a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology assumed to take a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specication, where it is further
assumed that skilled labour is relatively more complementary to Kf;et than
unskilled labour. This is captured by the following production function:
Yt = At

Kf;qt







n
(Aet )


Kf;et
o
+ (1  )

hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )

hfu;t
' 1 a'
(7)
where,
0 < a; ;  < 1;  1 < ';  < 1;
At is total factor productivity; Aet is the e¢ ciency level of capital equipment;
', and  are the parameters determining the factor elasticities, i.e. 1=(1 ') is
the elasticity of substitution between equipment capital and unskilled labour
and between skilled and unskilled labour, whereas 1=(1 ) is the elasticity of
substitution between equipment capital and skilled labour; and a; ;  are the
factor share parameters. In this specication, capital-skill complementarity is
obtained if 1=(1 ) < 1=(1 '). Appendix B analytically conrms that the
skill premium, dened as ws
wu
, is increasing in equipment capital, Kf;et , and
decreasing in the relative supply of skilled labour,
hfs;t
hfu;t
, for the parameter
restrictions considered.
Following the literature, At and Aet are assumed to follow stochastic ex-
ogenous AR(1) processes:
At+1 = (1  A)A+ AAt + "At (8)
Aet+1 = (1  Ae)Ae + AeAet + "Aet (9)
10Recent studies in the dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) literature which employ this
specication include, e.g. Lindquist (2004), Pourpourides (2011) and He (2012).
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where "At and "
Ae
t are independently and identically distributed Gaussian
random variables with zero means and standard deviations given respectively
by A and Ae.11
Under this production technology, an increase in the e¢ ciency level of
capital equipment, Aet , favours the productivity of skilled workers more than
the productivity of unskilled workers and is thus skill-biased. Hence, the
model is consistent with the empirical evidence that points to rising pro-
ductivity for equipment capital and a rising skill premium over the recent
decades (see e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992) and Krusell et al. (2000); also see
Hornstein et al. (2005) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for reviews).
Taking prices and policy variables as given, rms maximise prots:
t = Yt   ws;thfs;t   wu;thfu;t   retKf;et   rqtKf;qt
subject to the technology constraint in (7). In equilibrium, prots are zero.
2.3 The government
The government runs a balanced budget in every period which is given by:
Gct = nss;tws;thst + nuu;twu;thu;t + nhh;twu;thh;t+ (10)
+ s;tns
 
rqtK
q
s;t + r
e
tK
e
s;t

+ u;tnu
 
rqtK
q
u;t + r
e
tK
e
u;t

+ Tt
where Gct is average government consumption per agent. Since we focus
on the revenue side of the budget constraint, we assume that government
consumption spending is wasteful and follows an exogenous AR(1) process.
Thus its uctuations act as exogenous spending shocks which require a change
in the tax revenue collected (for a similar approach regarding Gct , see e.g.
Chari et al. (1994), Stockman (2001) and Arseneau and Chugh (2012)):
Gct+1 = (1  Gc)Gc + GcGct + "G
c
t (11)
where "G
c
t  iidN(0; 2Gc). Regarding the tax rates, we consider below policy
regimes where they are exogenously set or they are optimally chosen by the
government. Following Arseneau and Chugh (2012), when we consider how
the model economy behaves in response to exogenous scal policy, we use
lump-sum taxes as the residual variable in the government budget constraint,
11We consider the total factor productivity (TFP) and equipment capital augmenting
exogenous processes due to the predominant role attached to them in the literature on
economic uctuations and the skill premium. For example, see Lindquist (2004) and
Pourpourides (2011) who examine the skill premium in business cycle frequencies under
these two exogenous processes.
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since for this experiment we are not studying government nancing issues.
However, for the optimal policy analysis, again as in Arseneau and Chugh
(2012), lump-sum taxes are xed to zero.
In the literature that examines the optimality or not of tax smoothing
(see e.g. Chari et al. (1994) and Arseneau and Chugh (2012)), the gov-
ernment budget constraint includes debt. In contrast, here we focus on the
optimal allocation of the tax burden over the business cycle given the revenue
requirements of the government. Hence we do not allow the government to
issue debt to balance the budget (see also Stockman (2001), who considers
optimal capital and labour taxes with and without access to debt, albeit in
a di¤erent setup).
2.4 Market clearing conditions
The labour and capital market clearing conditions are given by:
hfs = nshs (12)
hfu = nuhu + nhhh (13)
Kit = nsK
i
s;t + nuK
i
u;t. (14)
The aggregate resource constraint is:
Yt = G
c
t + nsCs;t + nuCu;t + nhCh;t + ns
 
Iqs;t + I
e
s;t

+ nu
 
Iqu;t + I
e
u;t

+
+ ns s
h 
Kqs;t
2
+
 
Kes;t
2i
+ nu u
h 
Kqu;t
2
+
 
Keu;t
2i
. (15)
3 Exogenous policy
Before studying the models implications for optimal tax policy, we analyse
its cyclical properties under an exogenous scal policy. In this section, we
calibrate the model so that it generates empirically relevant business cycle
uctuations. We concentrate on the key labor market dimension that de-
termines inequality, i.e. the skill premium, when driven by the empirically
relevant government spending and income tax rate processes. Hence, we
assume that the income tax rates for j = s; u; h also follow AR(1) processes:
j;t+1 = (1  j) j + jj;t + "jt (16)
where "jt  Niid(0; j).
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3.1 Decentralized competitive equilibrium
Given initial levels of capital stock for structures, Kq0 , and equipment, K
e
0 ,
the four policy instruments (s;t; u;t; h;t; Gct) and the stationary stochas-
tic processes fAt; Aetg1t=0, the DCE system of equations is characterized by
a sequence of allocations fCs;t; Cu;t; Ch;t; hs;t; hu;t; hh;t; Kqs;t+1; Kes;t+1; Kqu;t+1;
Keu;t+1; I
q
s;t; I
e
s;t; I
q
u;t; I
e
u;tg1t=0, prices fws;t; wu;t; rqt ; retg1t=0, and the residual pol-
icy instrument fTtg1t=0 such that: (i) households maximize their welfare and
rms their prots, taking policy, prices and aggregate variables as given; (ii)
the government budget constraint is satised in each time period; (iii) all
markets clear and (iv) Cj;t 1 = Cj;t 1. The full decentralized competitive
equilibrium (DCE) is set out in Appendix A.
3.2 Data analysis and targets
We aim for the exogenous-policy model to replicate the long-run great ratios
and key labour market averages as well as explaining the cyclical volatilities
and correlations with output of key variables in the economy. We use quar-
terly data for U.S. economy, which are obtained from datasets constructed by
Lindquist (2004), Piketty and Saez (2007), Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008),
Pourpourides (2011), Arsenau and Chugh (2012) as well as data series from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).12
Table 1: Business cycle statistics of
main endogenous variables
Variable Correlation with output Standard deviation
Y 1 0.013-0.014
C 0.83 0.011-0.012
I 0.76-0.91 0.037-0.063
ws
wu
0.09-0.19 0.006-0.013
hs 0.42-0.69 0.008-0.010
hu 0.59-0.73 0.006-0.012
Sources: The data ranges are constructed using the results reported in
Lindquist (2004), Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) and Pourpourides (2011).
In Table 1 we report the data volatilities and correlations with output
from existing studies for variables which correspond with key endogenous
variables in our model. These are quarterly data for the period 1979-2002
(Lindquist (2004)) and 1979-2003 (Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) and Pour-
pourides (2011)). Their cyclical component has been obtained by taking the
12We are particularly grateful to Matthew Lindquist and Daniele Coen-Pirani for pro-
viding their datasets.
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logarithms of the series and then using an HP-lter with a smoothing para-
meter of 1600.13 As can be seen in Table 1, these studies document some
interesting results regarding the labour market statistics. In particular, they
point out that the skill premium is e¤ectively uncorrelated with output and
smoother than output in business cycle frequencies. Moreover, the cyclical
properties of the labour supply of skilled and unskilled workers do not di¤er
qualitatively, both having a positive correlation with output, while being less
volatile than output. The statistics regarding consumption, investment and
capital are similar to those commonly obtained in macroeconomic research.
Table 2: Data averages and business cycle statistics
of policy variables
Gc 60 100 20 60 0 20
Averages - 0.247 0.180 0.144
Autocorrelations 0.770 0.950 0.920 0.890
Correlations with Y -0.066 0.587 0.654 0.198
Standard deviation 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.004
Sources: The statistics are obtained using the data from Piketty
and Saez (2007), Arsenau and Chugh (2012) and BEA.
We further examine the statistical properties of the scal policy variables
in Table 2 where we present the means, as well as the rst-order autocorre-
lations, standard deviations and correlations with output for the tax rates
and government spending series. The government spending series is obtained
using quarterly data from the BEA for the period 1979 to 2002.14 The in-
come tax data are obtained using the Piketty and Saez (2007) dataset, which
reports annual data on income tax rates per income group (in quantiles) for
13To obtain labour supply per skill group at a quarterly frequency, these studies disag-
gregate the labour force into skilled and unskilled by taking into account the years spent
in education (i.e. skilled workers are those with 14 or more years of schooling). This is
based on the assumption that college-educated workers are primarily employed in occu-
pations that require high skills and have higher returns (see Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
and references therein). Acemoglu and Autor (2011) present annual data for the relative
supply of college-educated versus high-school graduates and for the wage premium paid
to college educated workers. We use the quarterly data for our business cycle analysis.
However, note that the average skill premium as well as its second moments using the an-
nual data and the classication in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) gives very similar results.
In particular, the skill premium on average is 1.60, while its cyclical relative volatility and
correlation with output are respectively given by 0.49 and -0.13.
14This series refers to government consumption expenditures and gross investment as
it is reported in NIPA Table 1.1.5. To calculate the statistical properties of the cyclical
component of the series, we log it and apply the HP-lter with a smoothing parameter of
1600.
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the period 1966-2001.15 As we explain below, we calibrate the share of hand-
to-mouth agents to be 20%, the share of unskilled workers who also have
savings to be 40% and the share of skilled workers to 40%. Since our model
predicts that the income levels of these three groups increase in the order
mentioned above, we use the Piketty and Saez (2007) dataset to obtain three
income tax rates, the rst for the lowest quantile, the second as the average
for the two middle quantiles, and the third as the average for the two top
quantiles. We use these series of tax rates as proxies for j;t, j = h; u; s,
respectively, in our model.
As can be seen in Table 2, the average tax for the bottom quantile, 0 20,
is equal to 14.4%, for the next two, 20 60, 18% and for top two, 60 100,
24.7%, suggesting that income taxation at this disaggregation is progres-
sive.16 Regarding the business cycle statistics of the tax series, the results
suggest that, as expected, these are highly persistent and have low volatility.
The spending process is less persistent and more volatile. The correlations
with output suggest that all the tax rates are pro-cyclical and the govern-
ment spending is essentially uncorrelated with output.17 Finally, using data
on the productivity of capital equipment from the BEA for the period 1988-
2011, we estimate the autocorrelation of HP-ltered series to be 0.975 and
its standard deviation to be 0.007.18
3.3 Calibration
The parameters of the model are calibrated either based directly on data
(including existing econometric evidence) or by ensuring that the steady-
state and cyclical properties of the key endogenous variables are consistent
15These tax rates refer to average tax rates by income groups. To obtain quarterly series
from the annual data, so that the cyclical statistics from the tax series are comparable to
the remaining data used in the analysis, we follow the interpolation method in Litterman
(1983). We use as an indicator variable the quarterly time-series of labour income tax
rates from Arsenau and Chugh (2012). To obtain the cyclical component of the series we
again use the HP-lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 (see also e.g. Arsenau and
Chugh (2012)).
16While Piketty and Saez (2007) discuss many aspects of the progressivity of income
taxation, we focus here on income taxes for the three income groups that best correspond
to the household disaggregation in our model.
17Note that using the annual series for tax rates, the results regarding the statistical
properties of the cyclical components of the series are similar qualitatively.
18The time-series on the productivity of equipment capital is obtained from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics and refers to annual data. The respective quarterly series is obtained
using the methodology in Litterman (1983), where the indicator variable is the quarterly
time-series of total investment for the same period. The series is then logged and HP-
ltered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
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with the data. The calibrated parameters are summarised in Table 3.
3.3.1 Population shares
We assume that the population breakdown in our model economy is given as
ns = 0:4, nu = 0:4, nh = 0:2. The share of skilled households is consistent
with the data in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), which implies that the average
share of the labour force with a college degree is about 45%. The split of
unskilled households into hand-to-mouth and those who can access the asset
market, coheres with empirical evidence from Traum and Yang (2010), who
estimate the share of the hand-to-mouth population for the U.S. at 18% and
Cogan et al. (2010), who estimate the share of the hand-to-mouth population
at 26.5%. The above split is also consistent with data from the 2010 U.S.
Census, which indicates that 43% of the populations has a college degree and
that the percentage of households without any assets is 18.7%.19
3.3.2 Tax-spending policy
A particular advantage of the 40=40=20 percent split is that it allows us to
approximate the e¤ective income tax rate which applies to each group by
using the Piketty and Saez (2007) income tax data per income quantile, as
described above. Therefore, we set the constant terms in the AR processes
described above, j, j = h; u; s, to be equal to the data averages for the
respective income quantiles, i.e. for 0 20, 20 60 and 60 100. Moreover,
we set j and j equal to the autocorrelation parameters and the standard
deviations of cyclical component of the respective tax series in the data (see
also e.g. Arsenau and Chugh (2012)). Following the same procedure, we also
set the autocorrelation and standard deviation parameters for the processes
for government spending (G and G) to be equal to the respective estimates
of the cyclical component of the public spending series described above (see
also e.g. Arsenau and Chugh (2012)). Finally, we calibrate the long-run
value of government spending to obtain a public spending to output ratio of
19%, consistent with the data discussed above.
3.3.3 Production and capital and labour markets
The elasticities of substitution between skilled labour and capital equipment
and between unskilled labour and capital equipment (or skilled labour) have
been estimated by Krusell et al. (2000). We use their estimates, so that ' =
19This information is obtained from Table 4 of the Census Bureau, Survey of Income
and Program Participation.
14
0:401 and  =  0:495. The remaining parameters in the production function
are calibrated to make the steady-state predictions of the model in asset and
labour markets consistent with the data (following e.g. Lindquist (2004), He
and Liu (2008), Pourpourides (2011) and He (2012)). The income shares 
and  are calibrated to obtain a skill premium of 1:66 and a labour share of
income of 69%, which are consistent with the U.S. data. In particular, the
target value for the skill premium is obtained from U.S. Census data and is
within the range of estimates in Table 1.20 The share of labour income in
GDP is obtained from BEA data on personal income for the period 1970-
2011. The productivity of capital structures,  is set at the same value
as Lindquist (2004) and helps to bring the models capital to output ratios
close to the data. The calibrated parameters in the production function are
generally very similar to those estimated or calibrated in the literature.
The depreciation rates of capital structures and capital equipment are
calibrated to obtain a quarterly capital to output ratio equal to 6:95 in the
steady-state. This is within the range presented in Table 1 and is consistent
with an annual capital to output ratio of 1:74, obtained using BEA annual
data on capital stocks from 1970 to 2011. In particular, we set e = 0:028
to be within the range of Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011) and
calibrate q = 0:016 residually.21
We set the transaction cost parameters as  s = 0:0002 and  u = 0:0018.
There are two targets for these parameters. The rst is that the total capital
holdings for skilled households in the deterministic steady-state is 2:5 times
higher than for unskilled households. This ensures that the models steady-
state matches data from the 2010 Census22, which indicate that the wealth of
the population with at least a bachelor degree is two and half times more than
those without a bachelor degree. The second target is that in the steady-
state the transaction costs cohere with a real return to capital (that excludes
depreciation, taxes and transaction costs) of about 1% per quarter.23
3.3.4 Utility function
The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, , is set following previous studies
(e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007) at  = 2. The time discount fac-
20The specic source is the Current Population Survey, 2011 Annual Social and Eco-
nomic Supplement from the U.S. Census Bureau.
21For instance, Krusell et al. (2000) report q = 0:0125 and e = 0:031; Pourpourides
q = 0:014 and e = 0:027; and Lindquist q = 0:014 and e = 0:031.
22The specic information is obtained using Table 1 from the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau,
Survey of Income and Program Participation.
23The real rate of return to capital at an annual frequency is 4%, using data from the
World Bank.
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tor,  = 0:99, is calibrated to target the investment to output ratio in the
data. The weight of consumption to utility,  = 0:225, is set so that in
the steady-state each household devotes about one third of its time to work,
consistent with the long-run averages reported in Table 1. The consumption
habit parameter, !, is calibrated so that the models predicted volatility of
consumption is similar to the data. The value employed of 0:58 is also within
the range (0:52  0:71) suggested by Christiano et al. (2005).
Table 3: Model parameters
Parameter Value Denition Source
0  q 1 0.016 depreciation rate of capital structures calibration
0  e 1 0.028 depreciation rate of capital equipment calibration
0 <  < 1 0.990 time discount factor calibration
0  ! < 1 0.580 habit persistence parameter calibration
0 <  < 1 0.225 weight attached to consumption in utility calibration
 > 1 2.000 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion assumption
0    1 0.130 income share of capital structures calibration
1
1  0.669 capital equipment to skilled labour elasticity assumption
1
1 ' 1.669 capital equipment to unskilled labour elasticity assumption
0 <  < 1 0.560 share of composite input to output calibration
0 <  < 1 0.580 share of capital equipment to composite input calibration
0 <G
c
Y
< 1 0.190 government spending calibration
 s> 0 0.0002 transaction cost for skilled agents calibration
 u> 0 0.0018 transaction cost for unskilled agents calibration
s 0.247 average income tax rate, skilled data
u 0.180 average income tax rate, unskilled data
h 0.144 average income tax rate, hand-to-mouth data
Stochastic processes
A 0.004 standard deviation of TFP calibration
A 0.950 AR(1) coe¢ cient of TFP data
Ae 0.007 standard deviation of cap. equipment data
Ae 0.975 AR(1) coe¢ cient of cap. equipment data
s 0.006 standard deviation of income tax, skilled data
s 0.950 AR(1) coe¢ cient of income tax, skilled data
u 0.005 standard deviation of income tax, unskilled data
u 0.920 AR(1) coe¢ cient of income tax, unskilled data
h 0.004 standard deviation of income tax, hand-to-mouth data
h 0.890 AR(1) coe¢ cient of income tax, hand-to-mouth data
Gc 0.014 standard deviation of public spending data
Gc 0.770 AR(1) coe¢ cient of public spending data
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3.3.5 Technology
The constant terms in the processes for TFP and capital equipment produc-
tivity are normalized to unity (i.e. A = 1 and Ae = 1 respectively). We set
the autocorrelation and standard deviation parameters for the processes for
capital equipment technology (Ae and Ae), equal to the respective estimates
of the cyclical component of the relevant data series described above (see also
e.g. Lindquist (2004), Pourpourides (2011)). The autocorrelation parameter
of TFP is set equal to 0:95, following Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides
(2011), while A is calibrated to match the volatility of output observed in
the data (see Table 1).
3.4 Solution and results
The steady-state solution of the DCE system for key variables is compared
with their corresponding data averages in Table 4. To study dynamics, we
compute a rst-order approximation of the equilibrium conditions around
the deterministic steady-state, by implementing the perturbation methods
in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003).24 We use the rst-order accurate de-
cision rules to simulate time paths of the equilibrium under shocks to total
factor productivity, capital equipment augmenting technology, government
spending, and income tax realizations, that are obtained from the distribu-
tions specied above. We conduct 1000 simulations, each 296 periods long.
We drop the initial 200 periods so that the remaining series length of 96
periods corresponds with the number of observations in the data, i.e. 1979:1-
2002:4. For each simulation, we then compute the required moments and
report the means of these moments across the simulations in Table 5. This
table also reports, for convenience, the predicted business cycle statistics
from the studies of Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011).
Table 4: Steady-state of the exogenous policy model
Variable Model Data Variable Model Data
K
Y
6.946 6.550 hs 0.362 0.317
I
Y
0.151 0.159 hu 0.364 0.348
C
Y
0.653 0.659 hh 0.398 -
Gc
Y
0.189 0.195 ws
wu
1.649 1.659
rnet 0.010 0.010
wh
Y
0.699 0.686
Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the predictions of the model with respect
to both the steady-state and business cycle properties of the series cohere
24We present results using a rst-order approximation throughout the paper. Our nd-
ings do not change by using a second-order approximation.
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well with the data.25 In particular, Table 4 shows that all model predictions
are quantitatively similar to the long-run averages in the data. It is also
worth noting that the ratio of average hours worked by unskilled workers to
the average hours worked by skilled labour in the model is 1:027, which is
similar to the 1:099 obtained for the U.S. from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (BLS) data.26 These work-time allocations imply Frisch (or -constant)
labour supply elasticities of 1:08 for skilled, 1:07 for unskilled and 0:93 for
hand-to-mouth workers, which are again generally consistent with the liter-
ature (see e.g. Browning et al. (1999), Chetty et al. (2011), and Keane and
Rogerson (2012)).27
Table 5: Business cycle statistics of the exogenous policy model
Correlation with Output Standard deviation
Variable Model Lindquist Pourpourides Model Lindquist Pourpourides
(2004) (2011) (2004) (2011)
Y 1 1 1 0.014 0.013 0.014
C 0.89 0.81 0.93 0.012 0.006 0.012
I 0.80 0.96 0.76 0.048 0.053 0.040
ws
wu
0.15 0.06 -0.09 0.005 0.003 0.005
hs 0.68 0.81 0.95 0.005 0.006 0.007
hu 0.28 0.95 0.54 0.004 0.006 0.012
hh -0.42 N/A N/A 0.007 N/A N/A
Turning to the business cycle statistics in Table 5, the overall t is com-
parable to existing research on business cycle models with the skill premium
(see e.g. Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011)). In particular, the model
matches the key stylised facts about the skill premium in the data, i.e. that
it is e¤ectively not correlated with output and that its volatility is less than
that of output (refer to Table 1). In addition, the model predictions regard-
25Note that the data sources for the series in Table 4 include: (i) BEA, NIPA Table 1.1.5
for output, investment and consumption; (ii) BEA, NIPA Table 1.1 (line 3 plus line 21
minus line 7) and Tables 7.1A (line 30) plus Table 7.2B (line 32) for the capital stock; (iii)
BLS, Current Employment Statistics survey for hours worked; (iv) World Bank for the real
rate of return; (v) BEA, NIPA Table 2.1 for labours share in income; and (vi) U.S. Census
Bureau, Survey of Income and Program Participation for the skill premium. Comparable
averages are obtained using the dataset in Lindquist (2004), for those variables that are
similar in both studies.
26The Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) quarterly data U.S. from 1979-2003 gives an un-
skilled to skilled labour supply ratio in e¢ ciency units equal to 1.030. Our model prediction
of 1.027 for the weighted ratio of unskilled to skilled labour coheres well with this gure.
27Table 4 also shows that the labours share of income in the model,
wsnshs+wunuhu+wunhhh
Y = 0:699 is close to the value (i.e. 0.686) obtained from the BEA
Table 2.1 for 1979-2002.
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ing the second moments of the hours worked are generally consistent with
the data both qualitatively and quantitatively. However, the model quanti-
tatively under-predicts the correlation of unskilled hours with output. The
model also matches the second moments of consumption and investment.
Overall, the models predictions regarding the key endogenous variables are
empirically relevant.
4 Optimal tax policy over the business cycle
Having established the empirical relevance of the calibration, we now discard
the exogenous processes for the income tax rates in (16) and instead assume
that the paths of these tax rates are optimally chosen by a government that
seeks to maximise a utilitarian objective function under commitment, taking
the revenue requirements as given.
4.1 The problem of the government
The government chooses the paths of the three income tax rates to maximise
aggregate welfare subject to the DCE under the following assumptions:28 (i)
It takes the spending side of the government budget as given. In particular,
government consumption spending continues to follow the exogenous process
in (11); (ii) it does not have a complete tax system at its disposal and can
only tax each agents total income;29 and (iii) it cannot issue debt. Treating
the spending side of the budget as given is a common assumption in the
analysis of optimal taxation and allows us to focus on the revenue side of
the budget. The second and third assumptions are motivated by current
economic reality. In particular, the politico-economic framework does not
allow governments to tax all sources of income di¤erently and existing levels
of debt imply that it cannot be easily used to smooth economic uctuations.
In light of the labour and asset market imperfections and the restrictions
placed on government policy we ask - what is the optimal distribution of
the income tax burden over the business cycle? The requirements imposed
28We also keep lump-sum taxes xed to zero, as is common for optimal taxation analysis.
We note, however, that our results do not change qualitatively if we keep the lump-sum
instrument xed to its steady-state value obtained from the model under exogenous policy.
29We examine an optimal taxation problem with an incomplete set of tax instruments,
since tax rates are not available for all pairs of goods in the economy (see e.g. Chari and
Kehoe (1999), for the denition of a complete tax system). Motivatived by constraints
imposed on economic policy in practice, we consider a government that is restricted to tax
capital and labour income at the same rate. However it is allowed to choose a di¤erent
tax rate for each income group in the economy.
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on the tax system certainly dictate some properties that optimal income
taxation must satisfy over the business cycle. In particular, we would expect
income taxes on average to be more volatile compared to the data since tax
smoothing via public debt or expenditure management is not an option. We
would also expect them to be generally counter-cyclical, given that negative
shocks that reduce the tax bases necessitate a rise in the tax rates to make up
for the loss in the tax revenue. However, allowing the government to choose
di¤erent tax rates for each income group, implies that the government still
has to decide on whether these tax rates should have the same volatility and
comovement with output over the business cycle and, if not, how to set
these cyclical properties for each tax rate.
We examine the problem of a government that has Utilitarian preferences,
so that its objective function is given by the expected lifetime utility of the
weighted average of the welfare of the three types of households, where the
weights attached to each type are equal to the population share of that type,
nj. In this case, the government chooses fs;t; u;t; h;t; Cs;t; Cu;t; Ch;t; hs;t; hu;t;
hh;t; K
q
s;t+1; K
e
s;t+1; K
q
u;t+1; K
e
u;t+1; I
q
s;t; I
e
s;t; I
q
u;t; I
e
u;t; ws;t; wu;t; r
q
t ; r
e
tg1t=0, to max-
imise:
U g = Et
X
j=s;u;h
"
nj
1X
t=0
tu(Cj;t; Cj;t 1; lj;t)
#
(17)
subject to the DCE equations (18) (47) in Appendix A, where we set fTt 
0g1t=0. Note that the government internalises the externalities in consumption
when making its optimal choices. We also assume that the government can
commit to the optimal paths.
As in the exogenous-policy baseline, we rst compute the determinis-
tic steady-state equilibrium under optimal policy and next approximate the
dynamic equilibrium paths using the rst-order approximation of the equilib-
rium conditions under optimal policy for time t > 0 around the deterministic
steady-state of these conditions. As is common in the literature (see e.g. Ar-
senau and Chugh (2012)), when characterizing asymptotic policy dynamics,
we also make the auxiliary assumption that the initial state of the economy
at t = 0 is the steady-state under optimal policy. We use the rst-order ac-
curate decision rules to simulate the optimal-policy equilibrium under shocks
to TFP, equipment capital and government consumption spending that are
obtained as in the exogenous-policy experiments in the previous section.30
30To calculate the business cycle statistics of the model under optimal policy we work
as in the exogenous policy case. In particular, we conduct simulations under shocks to the
exogenous processes, obtain the required statistics for each simulation and then calculate
their mean value across the simulations. We conduct 1000 simulations, each 296 periods
long and drop the initial 200 periods.
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4.2 Optimal taxes over the business cycle
Table 6 presents the optimal properties of the tax system under shocks to
all stochastic processes. As can be seen by the steady-state income taxes,
optimal tax policy is progressive and, in fact, relatively more progressive
compared with the data averages. In particular, s > 60 100, u < 20 60,
h < 0 20.31 This is noteworthy since the progressivity of the tax system as
captured by the three tax rates considered here has indeed increased since
the mid-1960s (see e.g. the data in Piketty and Saez (2007)).32 Therefore,
the assumed imperfections and inequalities in our model justify progressive
income taxation.
Table 6: Optimal tax policy
s u h
Steady-state 0.285 0.143 -0.041
Autocorrelations 0.754 0.832 0.891
Correlations with Y -0.461 -0.732 -0.110
Standard deviation 0.012 0.070 0.173
These results in Table 6 further suggest that the volatility and co-movement
of optimal taxes with output di¤er signicantly with each other and with the
data reported in Table 2. As discussed above, the policy problem we con-
sider implies that the tax rates need to be generally more volatile and more
counter-cyclical, compared with the data. However, Table 6 also reveals im-
portant di¤erences between the tax rates. These result from the trade-o¤
that the government faces when deciding how to distribute the distortions
reected by the higher volatility and countercyclicality of the three tax rates
over the business cycle. On one hand, such distortions have a larger impact
on hand-to-mouth households, since they are less able to smooth shocks.
There is thus an incentive to minimise the impact of policy for this type of
household. On the other hand, tax-induced distortions to skilled households
have the strongest propagation e¤ects in the economy, given the complemen-
tarity of skilled hours with equipment capital. Therefore, there is also an
31The bigger di¤erence between the optimal and the actual level of taxes is observed
in the taxation of the lowest income group. However, in practice, targeted subsidies may
reduce the e¤ective tax burden for this group as well, bringing the optimal e¤ective tax
burden for the low income, relative to the higher income groups predicted here closer
to reality. Since, as explained above, we exclude lump-sum instruments from the policy
menu, we do not consider further the role of targeted transfers.
32For instance, using the Piketty and Saez (2007) dataset, 60 100 has increased from
20% to 25%, 20 60 has decreased from 18% to 14% and 0 40 has decreased from 16% to
11%, between 1966 and 2001.
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incentive to minimise distortions to the choices of skilled households, since
this acts to amplify external shocks.
To analyse further the cyclical properties of optimal taxes in this frame-
work, we start with the standard deviations. Recall that in the data, the
volatilities of the tax rates are increasing with the level of the tax rate, but
these di¤erences are small, as the standard deviations of the three rates are
quantitatively similar. In contrast, given the balanced budget restriction and
the instruments available to the government, the optimal volatility of taxes
is, as expected, higher than that found in the data. However, the increase
in volatility is not the same across the three taxes. It is the highest for the
low-income group and the lowest for the high-income group.33
A smoother income tax creates fewer distortions in the households op-
timisation problem. Since income taxes are the only choices for the policy-
maker in this framework, implying that smoothing is not possible for all tax
rates, the government nds it optimal to keep the tax rate which distorts
incentives the most, the smoothest. Given the higher complementarities of
skilled hours with equipment capital, implying that tax-induced uctuations
in skill supply propagate more in the economy via the equipment capital
channel, the government nds it optimal to keep the tax to skilled house-
holds the least volatile. In contrast, since hand-to-mouth households do not
own capital stock, their choices a¤ect the endogenous propagation mecha-
nism in the economy the least, so that their taxes are optimally the most
volatile.
Recall from Table 2 that all income taxes are found to be pro-cyclical
in the data, with output correlations in the range of 0.2 (for 0 20) to 0.65
(for 20 60). As expected, the results in Table 6 conrm that the correlations
become negative when the tax instruments are the only optimally chosen
instruments in the governments budget constraint. However, this Table
also shows that the optimal correlations of the tax rates are symmetrically
opposite to the data correlations. For example, the strongest pro-cyclical
tax in the data becomes optimally the strongest counter-cyclical one, while
the least cyclical in the data becomes the least counter-cyclical. Hence, the
requirement of the government to make the tax system generally counter-
cyclical, is not translated into a proportional reduction of the correlation
coe¢ cients of all tax rates.34
33Our results regarding the magnitude and range in volatilities of taxes are within the
range of the optimal volatilities for tax instruments considered in the model with search
frictions and government debt in Arsenau and Chugh (2012) and the neoclassical model
with a balanced budget restriction in Stockman (2001).
34While the literature has not considered optimal income taxation for di¤erent levels
of income as we do in this paper, it has nevertheless demonstrated that market frictions
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Counter-cyclical taxes intensify uctuations in income, as they amplify
the e¤ects of exogenous productivity shocks. Therefore, a government that
needs to make use of counter-cyclical taxes over the business cycle, does so
with a view to minimise the distortions that they cause. In this setup, it
is optimal to minimise such policy distortions to the income of the hand-to-
mouth households, by making their tax rate to be the least counter-cyclical.
This is because these agents are the most exposed to economic uctuations.
Comparing skilled and unskilled households, it is optimal to least distort the
choices of skilled, given the higher complementarities of skilled hours with
equipment capital. As a result, the unskilled workers face the most counter-
cyclical income tax.
Finally, there are not signicant di¤erences regarding the persistence of
tax rates. Recall that in the data, all taxes are highly persistent. When
chosen optimally, they are somewhat less persistent (particularly s), but
they are qualitatively of similar magnitudes.
4.3 The optimal distribution of the tax burden over
the business cycle
We are now in a position to analyse the optimal reaction of tax policy to
di¤erent exogenous shocks by examining the impulse responses (IRs) of the
key economic variables after a temporary standard deviation shock to each of
the exogenous processes. These are plotted in Figures 1 and 2. This allows
us to evaluate how the government optimally distributes the tax burden
in the short- and medium-run in response to output-enhancing exogenous
shocks. Figure 1 concentrates on the optimal taxes and the distribution of
the tax burden post shock whereas Figure 2 documents the responses of the
remaining endogenous variables.35
Starting with the impulse responses to a positive TFP shock, we see that
h is the only tax that increases on impact (see Figure 1). This is because the
government, in the short-run, nds it optimal to make this tax pro-cyclical to
facilitate a smoother consumption response from hand-to-mouth households.
do matter for the optimal level of cyclicality of income taxes. For instance, while in the
neoclassical model the labour income tax is generally positively related with the TFP
shocks and thus tends to be pro-cyclical, in the labour marker frictions model of Arsenau
and Chugh (2012), the labour income tax is optimally counter-cyclical.
35Figure 1 plots the optimal response of the tax rates in: (i) levels (row 1); (ii) percent
deviations from the steady-state (row 2); and (iii) di¤erences between the relevant percent
deviations (row 3). Thus, row 3 shows how the relative tax burden is distributed in
response to the shocks considered. Figure 2, as in row 2 of Figure 1 plots the standard
impulse responses.
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As can also be seen, in the short-run both s and u fall, as the government can
reduce these tax rates and maintain the same tax revenue, given the rise in tax
bases. The reduction is bigger for the tax rate on unskilled labour. Therefore,
the response of optimal income taxes with respect to the progressivity of the
tax system is mixed after a positive TFP shock, as, on one hand, the tax
rate on the low income is increased, while, on the other, the middle-income
households benet from the biggest reduction.
Moreover, the dynamic paths for the taxes show that the fall in s is
temporary, as in the medium-run the government nds it optimal to increase
s above its steady-state. As the economy returns to the steady-state, it is
optimal for the government to generate the tax revenue required by increasing
faster the tax rate for the largest income source, so that is can maintain a low
tax rate for unskilled and hand-to-mouth for longer. Figure 2 shows that the
increase in equipment capital and decrease in relative skill supply induced
by the changes in TFP and income taxation increase the skill premium. As
a result, the skill premium is procyclical.
[Figures 1 and 2 here]
The response of optimal taxes is very di¤erent under a positive capital
equipment technology shock. In particular, this shock creates an increase in
wage inequality (see Figure 2), reecting the rise in the productivity of skilled
labour via capital-skill complementarity, to which the government responds,
by increasing the tax for skilled workers and decreasing the tax for unskilled
workers.36 Hence, in this case, the government nds it optimal, given the
exogenous productivity gains for skilled households, to redistribute the tax
burden in favour of the unskilled households. As a result, income taxation
becomes more progressive.
After an output-enhancing temporary reduction to government spending
all taxes can fall, since the government needs to generate less tax revenue.
However, driven by the incentive to support the households who are most
constrained in the asset market, the reduction is bigger for h, followed by
that for u. Therefore, a temporary spending cut is followed by an increase
in the progressivity of income taxes. The reductions in the income tax rates
lead to a proportionately larger increase for the supply of unskilled labour,
relative to skilled, which in turn increases the skill premium (see Figure 2).
36Note that in this case the amount of equipment capital is reduced after a positive
capital equipment technological shock (see Figure 2). This result is due the important
income gains accruing to skilled workers by the increase in the returns to this asset.
This allows them to reduce investment in this asset and increase consumption. A similar
response of equipment capital is obtained in Lindquist (2004).
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4.3.1 Robustness of results
We further examine the optimal reaction of tax policy to di¤erent exogenous
shocks under di¤erent assumptions regarding the quantitiative importance
of transaction costs and capital-skill complementarity. In Figure 3, we show,
for each case, the optimal path of the three income tax rates starting from
the non-stochastic steady state. For comparison, we also present the optimal
paths under the benchmark case analysed above.
[Figure 3 here]
In particular, we consider three alternative calibrations and present the
optimal taxes in each case, in response to exogenous output-enhancing shocks.
In Model 1, we consider a case where the transaction costs for skilled and
unskilled workers are ve times greater than their benchmark value in Table
3. In Model 2, we examine a case where the equipment capital-skill substi-
tutability rises, as  is reduced from  =  0:495 to  =  0:40.37 In Model 3,
we examine the case where the equipment capital-unskilled substitutability
falls, as ' is reduced from ' = 0:401 to ' = 0:30.38
The general message from Figure 3 is that the responses of optimal policy
are quantitatively very similar across the di¤erent model variants. Hence,
our results regarding the optimal reaction to exogenous shocks are robust
to changes in the magnitude of transaction costs and production function
elasticities.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied how the progressivity of the income tax system
optimally changed over the business cycle in an economy characterised by
capital-skill complementarity, a wage premium to skilled workers and market
imperfections that create unequal opportunities to households regarding their
participation in the labour and capital markets. In particular, we assumed
that a subset of households provided skill labour services, whereas the rest
worked as unskilled. Moreover, participation premia in the capital markets
varied in such a way that a subset of the unskilled households was excluded
from investing in the capital stock. The model was shown to capture the
empirical regularities of macroeconomic variables over the business cycle and
37This requires that we re-calibrate  = 0:5676 and  = 0:5243, so that the factor shares
remain the same and the production function is uniquely identied (see e.g. Cantore and
Levine, 2012).
38In this case we re-calibrate  = 0:5727 and  = 0:5808.
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was consistent with key features of the labour markets and wealth ownership
that we considered.
Our analysis considered the problem of a government that chose the paths
of income tax rates to maximise aggregate welfare. In doing so we constrained
the policy menu of the government to focus on income taxes that applied to
total household income only. We then characterised the business cycle prop-
erties of optimal income taxes under these policy constraints and examined
the optimal reaction of income taxation under di¤erent exogenous shocks.
With respect to business cycle properties, we found that the volatility
and co-movement of optimal taxes with output di¤ered signicantly with
each other and with the data. In particular, optimal policy kept the tax rate
for skilled agents the least volatile and the tax rate for the hand-to-mouth
agents the least countercyclical. In contrast, the path of optimal taxes for
the middle income group, made up by unskilled households with savings, was
very volatile and counter-cyclical.
Regarding exogenous shocks, the government found it optimal to respond
to output-enhancing capital equipment technology and spending cuts by in-
creasing the progressivity of income taxes. On the other hand, the optimal
response to positive TFP shocks implied that the progressivity of the tax
system increases after about two years.
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6 Appendix A: DCE system of equations
6.1 Skilled households
FOC for consumption:
0 =

(Cs;t   !Cs;t 1) (1  hs;t)1 
(1 )
Cs;t   !Cs;t 1 + 
1
t (18)
FOC for hours worked:
0 =  

(Cs;t   !Cs;t 1) (1  hs;t)1 
(1 )(1 )
Cs;t   !Cs;t 1   
1
t (1  s;t)ws;t (19)
FOC for capital structures:
0 = 2t + 

Et
1
t+1

(s;t+1   1) rqt+1 + 2 sKqs;t+1

+ Et
2
t+1 (
q   1)	 (20)
FOC for capital equipment:
0 = 3t + 

Et
1
t+1

(s;t+1   1) ret+1 + 2 sKes;t+1

+ Et
3
t+1 (
e   1)	 (21)
FOC for investment in capital structures:
0 = 1t   2t (22)
FOC for investment in capital equipment:
0 = 1t   3t (23)
Capital structures evolution equation:
0 = Kqs;t+1   (1  q)Kqs;t   Iqs;t (24)
Capital equipment evolution equation:
0 = Kes;t+1   (1  e)Kes;t   Ies;t (25)
where 1t , 
2
t and 
3
t are respectively, the Lagrange multipliers with respect to
the budget constraint as well as the capital structures and capital equipment
evolution equations of the skilled agent. Based on Walraslaw only N   1
constraints are required in the DCE, hence we drop the budget constraint of
the skilled worker.
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6.2 Unskilled households
FOC for consumption:
0 =

(Cu;t   !Cu;t 1) (1  hu;t)1 
(1 )
Cu;t   !Cu;t 1 + 
4
t (26)
FOC for hours worked:
0 =  

(Cu;t   !Cu;t 1) (1  hu;t)1 
(1 )(1 )
Cu;t   !Cu;t 1   
4
t (1  u;t)wu;t (27)
FOC for capital structures:
0 = 5t + 

Et
4
t+1

(u;t+1   1) rqt+1 + 2 uKqu;t+1

+ Et
5
t+1 (
q   1)	 (28)
FOC for capital equipment:
0 = 6t + 

Et
1
t+1

(u;t+1   1) ret+1 + 2 uKeu;t+1

+ Et
6
t+1 (
e   1)	 (29)
FOC for investment in capital structures:
0 = 4t   5t (30)
FOC for investment in capital equipment:
0 = 4t   6t (31)
Budget constraint:
0 = Cu;t + I
q
u;t + I
e
u;t   (1  u;t) rqtKqu;t   (1  u;t) retKeu;t  (32)
  (1  u;t)wu;thu;t + Tt +  u
h 
Kqu;t
2
+
 
Keu;t
2i
Capital structures evolution equation:
0 = Kqu;t+1   (1  q)Kqu;t   Iqu;t (33)
Capital equipment evolution equation:
0 = Keu;t+1   (1  e)Keu;t   Ieu;t (34)
where 4t , 
5
t and 
6
t are respectively, the Lagrange multipliers with respect to
the budget constraint as well as the capital structures and capital equipment
evolution equations of the unskilled agent.
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6.3 Hand-to-mouth households
FOC for consumption:
0 =

(Ch;t   !Ch;t 1) (1  hh;t)1 
(1 )
Ch;t   !Ch;t 1 + 
7
t (35)
FOC for labour:
0 =  

(Ch;t   !Ch;t 1) (1  hh;t)1 
(1 )(1 )
Ch;t   !Ch;t 1   
7
t (1  h;t)wu;t (36)
Budget constraint:
0 = Ch;t   (1  h;t)wu;thh;t + Tt (37)
where 7t is the Langrange multiplier with respect to the budget constraint
of the hand-to-mouth agent.
6.4 Firms
FOC for capital structures:
0 =
Yt
Kf;qt
  rqt (38)
FOC for capital equipment:
0 =   K
f;e
t Yt
Kf;et 

1
t (

1
t )
 1
'
h
(Aet )


Kf;et

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where 
1t  
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
h
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FOC for skilled labour hours:
0 =
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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1
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1
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where 
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h
(Aet )
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.
FOC for unskilled labour hours:
0 =
At

Kf;qt

(1  ) (1  ) (nuhu;t + nhhh;t)'

1t (

1
t )
 1
' (nuhu;t + nhhh;t)
  wu;t (41)
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6.5 Government budget constraint
0 = Gct   Tt   nhh;twu;thh;t   nss;t
 
ws;ths;t + r
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e
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e
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q
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q
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e
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6.6 Aggregate Resource Constraint
0 = Yt  Gct   nsCs;t   nuCu;t   nhCh;t   ns
 
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6.7 Market clearing conditions
hfs;t = nshs;t (44)
hfu;t = nuhu;t + nhhh;t (45)
Kf;et = nsK
e
s;t + nuK
e
u;t (46)
Kf;qt = nsK
q
s;t + nuK
q
u;t (47)
7 Appendix B: The skill premium
Using equations (40) and (41) implies the following expression for the skill
premium:
ws;t
wu;t
=
 (1  )
(1  )

hfs;t
 1

hfu;t
' 1  1t '= 1 . (48)
where 1t  
h
(Aet)


Kf;et
i
+ (1  )

hfs;t

.
The skill premium is increasing with respect to capital equipment as
long as the equipment-skill complementarity is present, i.e.  < 0, and
the unskilled agents are substitutes to both of them, i.e. 0 < ' < 1. Also,
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for the
@

ws;t
wu;t

@(Kf;et )
> 0 condition to hold it is necessary that 0 < ;  < 1 which
is satised through our calibration as in Krusell et al. (2000):
@

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
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Moreover the skill premium is decreasing to skilled labour supply,
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where the terms that dene the sign are: (1 )
(1 ) > 0 and the term inside the
squared brackets +(  ') (1  )

hfs;t
 1
< 0 (due to the fact that  < 0
and 0 < ' < 1).
Also, the skill premium is increasing to unskilled labour supply,
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now the crucial terms are: (1 )
(1 ) (1  '), where (1 )(1 ) > 0 and also (1  ')
since 0 < ' < 1.
The last two derivatives, (50  51), imply that the skill premium is de-
creasing with respect to the relative labour supply of skilled over unskilled
agents, i.e. @

ws;t
wu;t

=@

hfs;t
hfu;t

< 0.
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Figure 1: Optimal distribution of the tax burden
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Figure 2: Impulse responses (optimal policy)
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Figure 3: Optimal tax rates for benchmark model and alternative calibrations
